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ABSTRACT 
United States law, which requires financial institutions to retain 
customer data, conflicts with European Union law, which requires 
financial institutions to delete customer data on demand. A financial 
institution operating transnationally cannot comply with both U.S. and 
EU law. Financial institutions thus face the issue that they cannot 
possibly delete and retain the same data simultaneously. This Note 
will clarify the scope and nature of this conflict. 
First, it will clarify the conflict by examining (1) the relevant laws, 
which are Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the 
U.S. Bank Secrecy Act, and Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) regulations, (2) GDPR’s application to U.S. financial 
institutions, and (3) U.S. law’s extraterritorial application to financial 
institutions operating in Europe, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Morrison-Kiobel two-step analysis. Second, it will propose a solution 
by examining international law and U.S. foreign relations law. 
United States law subjects financial institutions to multiple data-
retention requirements. Securities regulations require broker-dealers 
to retain customer account and complaint records. The Bank Secrecy 
Act of 1970 requires financial institutions to retain customer data for 
at least five years. Sometimes, banks must permanently retain certain 
records. 
GDPR empowers individuals to demand that companies erase their 
data. Couched in the theory of a right to erasure, GDPR lets customers 
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withdraw their consent for a financial institution to process or retain 
their data. Violators may face fines of 4 percent of their worldwide 
revenue. GDPR applies broadly to U.S. data-processors that either (1) 
are established in the European Union, or (2) monitor or offer to sell 
goods or services to individuals in the European Union. Establishment 
is broadly construed by European courts and may be met by “a single 
representative in the European Union.” 
In U.S. law, a two-step analysis determines whether and to what extent 
federal statutes govern conduct abroad. First, courts analyze whether 
the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted. The 
presumption derives from the canon that a statute, “unless a contrary 
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial 
jurisdiction” of the United States. If the presumption is not rebutted, 
the court proceeds to the second step, when the court considers the 
statute’s “focus” and whether the case involves the statute’s domestic 
application. United States law has domestic application to data stored 
domestically, and sometimes possibly to data stored internationally; 
such data operations may also fall under GPDR’s jurisdiction. Then, 
if a customer asks a financial institution to delete data, the financial 
institution will face conflicting laws. 
This Note seeks to resolve the conflict, recommending that courts 
approach resolution from the framework of the Restatement (Third) 
of Foreign Relations Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
United States financial law conflicts with European Union data 
protection law. United States financial law, meaning banking law and 
securities law, requires financial institutions to keep and maintain 
customer data for specified time periods.1 Specifically, securities law 
requires certain classes of data to be kept and maintained on non-
rewritable, non-erasable storage media.2 European Union data protection 
law requires firms doing business with European customers to honor 
customer requests for data erasure.3 
A U.S. financial institution doing business with customers from the 
European Union cannot possibly comply with both sets of laws as it 
cannot preserve and erase the same data simultaneously. Therefore, if a 
U.S.-regulated financial institution does business with a European 
customer who later demands erasure, the institution faces conflicting 
requirements. This issue is especially prominent in light of the financial 
system’s international nature. Investors from EU Member States traded 
over $16.52 trillion U.S. securities in the first half of 2018, and at the end 
of 2017, 5.15 percent of FINRA member-firms had foreign offices.4 
Part I of this Note focuses first on U.S. federal law. It discusses 
financial law and foreign relations law. Financial law consists of banking 
law and securities law. Each require U.S. financial institutions to keep and 
maintain customer data for minimum time periods. Securities law requires 
broker-dealers to keep and maintain much of this data in a format that 
cannot be altered or erased during the retention period.5 
United States foreign relations law consists of two parts “(a) 
international law as it applies to the United States; and (b) domestic law 
that has [either] substantial significance for . . . foreign relations . . . or . . 
. substantial international consequences.”6 The domestic component 
                                                            
 1. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(a-b) (2019). 
 2. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(f)(2)(ii)(A) (2019). 
 3. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43 (EU). 
 4. The statistics were calculated based on the data in these two reports: 2018 
FINRA Industry Snapshot (2018), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/ 
files/2018_finra_industry_snapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY86-ZYGR]; Securities 
Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Foreign Activity Report: Second Quarter 2018 (Aug. 2018), 
https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/US-Foreign-Activity-Report-2018-
08-17-SIFMA.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E5Q-BY55]. 
 5. See generally, Part I.A.2, infra. 
 6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 1 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1987). 
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mainly consists of the Constitution, statutes, court decisions, federal rules, 
and federal regulatory actions.7 The domestic component includes 
conflict of law rules, i.e., “law directed to resolving controversies between 
private persons . . . arising out of situations having a significant 
relationship to more than one state.”8 
Part I also focuses on two subjects in EU law. First, it discusses the 
data protection law: the General Data Protection Regulation. In particular, 
pursuant to Article 17(1), the General Data Protection Regulation 
compels firms who do business with European customers to erase 
personal data about any customers who demand erasure.9 Second, Part I 
discusses European financial regulation under the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive. Specifically, it focuses on that law’s limited data 
retention requirements for European investment firms. Such requirements 
are relevant to the interest balancing test discussed in Parts II and III. 
Part II focuses on frameworks for resolving this conflict, both when 
litigated in U.S. courts and when litigated in European courts. United 
States foreign relations law and customary international law both suggest 
an interest balancing approach to resolving conflicts of law.10 
Understanding interest balancing requires understanding the concepts of 
jurisdiction to prescribe and international comity.11 
United States foreign relations law does not bind the European 
Union.12 Litigating data-related conflicts in European courts would likely 
result in a judgment against the U.S. financial institution when, as 
discussed in Part II, European conflict of law rules apply European data 
                                                            
 7. Id. § 1 cmt. b. 
 8. Id. § 101 cmt. c. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1969)) (noting that most countries call this topic “private international law” 
and including private international law in domestic foreign relations law because “many 
matters of private international law have substantial international significance and 
therefore may be considered foreign relations law” under section 1). 
 9. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU). 
 10. See generally infra Part II. 
 11. See discussion infra Part II. 
 12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., 
Introduction (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“As the Reporters of the previous Restatement said 
(p. xii): ‘[t]he positions or outlooks of particular states, including the United States, 
should not be confused with what a consensus of states would accept or support.’ Like 
the previous Restatement, this Restatement represents the opinion of The American Law 
Institute as to the rules that an impartial tribunal would apply if charged with deciding a 
controversy in accordance with international law.”). 
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protection law instead of U.S. financial law.13 Part II also discusses the 
European Union’s jurisdiction to enforce judgments against non-
European businesses in the United States. 
Part III first balances each states’ interest in applying its substantive 
law. Then, it performs balancing tests for banking law and securities law. 
In so balancing, it offers a resolution to the conflict when litigated in U.S. 
courts. Since European conflict of law rules govern the conflict in 
European courts, Part III examines the enforceability of European 
judgments against U.S. financial institutions in U.S. courts. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL LAW 
At the federal level, U.S. financial law includes securities law and 
banking law. Banking law is a patchwork of statutes and regulations, such 
as the Bank Secrecy Act and the Foreign Asset Control Regulations.14 
Securities law is an even more complex patchwork of statutes, 
regulations, and self-regulatory rules.15 This section will first explain 
relevant banking law and then explain relevant securities law. 
1. United States Banking Law 
The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 is one of the most important federal 
banking statutes. Treasury regulations under the Bank Secrecy Act 
require financial institutions to “retain records required by the Bank 
Secrecy Act for a period of five years.”16 These records include, inter alia: 
                                                            
 13. See discussion infra Part II. 
 14. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 500 (2019); OFFICE OF 
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) & Related Regulations, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/compliance-bsa/bsa/bsa-regulations/index-bsa-
regulations.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/DU2B-SHKY]; Elizabeth 
Fast, Document Retention Policy for Banks, SPENCER FANE LLP (Jul. 15, 2016), 
https://www.spencerfane.com/publication/document-retention-policy-for-
banks/https://www.spencerfane.com/publication/document-retention-policy-for-banks/ 
[https://perma.cc/3HZ5-U9XL]. 
 15. See discussion infra Part I.A.2. 
 16. Stacey Garrett, Cybersecurity Law & Strategy, “Are U.S. Records Retention 
Requirements on a Collision Course with the GDPR’s ‘Right to Erasure?’”, L. J. 
NEWSLS. (May 2018) (citing 31 C.F.R. § 1010.430(d) (2019)). 
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A record of each extension of credit in an amount in excess of $10,000 
. . . [containing] the name and address of the person to whom the 
extension of credit is made . . . 
A record of each . . . instruction received or given regarding any 
transaction resulting (or intended to result . . .) in the transfer of 
currency or other monetary instruments, funds, checks, investment 
securities, or credit, of more than $10,000 to or from any person, 
account, or place outside the United States. 
A record of each . . . instruction given to another financial institution 
or other person located within or without the United States, regarding 
a transaction intended to result in the transfer . . . of more than $10,000 
to a person, account or place outside the United States.17 
The Bank Secrecy Act also requires banks to maintain Customer 
Identification Programs (CIPs).18 A CIP must provide for the collection 
of identifying data about the bank’s customers, e.g., their name, date of 
birth, and an identification number—such as a taxpayer identification 
number or passport number.19 The bank must retain this data for at least 
five years after the account closes.20 In addition to the Bank Secrecy Act, 
various other federal statutes also impose mandatory minimum document 
retention periods, such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Truth in 
Lending Act, Truth in Savings Act, and Electronic Funds Transfer Act.21 
 
                                                            
 17. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.410 (2019). 
 18. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL: CORE EXAMINATION OVERVIEW AND PROCEDURE 
FOR REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND RELATED TOPICS: CUSTOMER IDENTIFICATION 
PROGRAM—OVERVIEW 45, https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/ 
olm_011.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9H3M-AUCL] (citing 12 
C.F.R. §§ 21.21, 208.63(b), 211.5(m), 211,24(j), 748.2(b); 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220 (2019)) 
(“The CIP is intended to enable the bank to form a reasonable belief that it knows the 
true identity of each customer. The CIP must include account opening procedures that 
specify the identifying information and practical risk-based procedures for verifying the 
identity of each customer.”). 
 19. Id. at 47 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6109 (2012)). 
 20. Id. at 49 (citing 31 C.F.R. § 103.38 (2019)). 
 21. Fast, supra note 14. 
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2. United States Securities Law 
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) 
imposed a comprehensive federal regulatory system on the securities 
industry:22 “The Exchange Act created the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), a federal agency with the authority to regulate the 
securities industry.”23 The SEC creates regulations under the Exchange 
Act and other federal statutes—such as the Securities Act of 1933—and 
also enforces federal securities law.24 However, “because the SEC lacks 
the resources to police the entire industry, it relies on” (a) a self-regulatory 
scheme created by Congress and (b) “industry members to promote 
compliance with the securities laws and regulations to pursue 
enforcement actions.”25 In 1938, Congress passed the Maloney Act, 
which amended the Exchange Act to create “extensive guidelines for the 
formation and oversight of self-regulatory organizations,” as well as to 
better regulate “over-the-counter brokers and dealers operating in 
interstate and foreign commerce . . . [and] to prevent acts and practices 
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade.”26 
Essentially, the Maloney Act authorized the SEC to delegate 
regulatory authority to a self-regulatory organization that registers as a 
national securities association.27 Associations applying to register as 
national securities associations must provide their rules to the SEC.28 
Once registered, a national securities association needs SEC approval to 
change its rules, and the SEC may “abrogate, add to, or delete from . . . 
the rules . . . as the [SEC] deems necessary or appropriate to insure the 
                                                            
 22. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 48 Stat. 881 (1934); 
Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 879–80 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Austin Mun. Sec., 
Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 757 F.2d 676, 680 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
 23. Legal Information Institute, Securities Law History, available at 
 https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_law_history (last visited Mar. 16, 2019); 
see also Birkelbach v. SEC, 751 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Gold v. SEC, 48 
F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 24. Securities Law History, supra note 23; U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, WHAT 
WE DO (June 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html 
[https://perma.cc/4Z44-DEXE]. 
 25. Birkelbach, 751 F.3d at 474 (citing Gold, 48 F.3d at 990); 15 U.S.C. § 78s 
(2012). 
 26. Maloney Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070, 1070 (1938); Karsner, 
532 F.3d 879–80 (quoting Austin, 757 F.2d at 680). 
 27. Maloney Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070, 1070 (1938). 
 28. Karsner, 532 F.3d at 880 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(a) (2012)). 
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fair administration of the self-regulatory organization [or] to conform its 
rules to [statutory requirements].”29 Sections 15 and 19 of the Exchange 
Act create a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the SEC to delegate 
authority to and exercise control over self-regulatory organizations that 
register as national securities associations.30 
Pursuant to this comprehensive regulatory scheme, the SEC 
delegated authority to Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), 
a self-regulatory organization (SRO) “as a national securities association 
registered with the SEC pursuant to the Maloney Act . . . .”31 FINRA has 
a monopoly on self-regulation of the securities industry because it is “the 
only officially registered national securities association” and all securities 
firms that “do business with the public” must be FINRA members and are 
thus subject to FINRA’s comprehensive oversight authority.32 FINRA is 
                                                            
 29. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b)(1), (c) (2012)); see also Birkelbach, 751 F.3d at 
475 n.2 (citing Aslin v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., 704 F.3d 475, 476 (7th Cir. 
2013)). 
 30. Scottsdale Capital Advisors Corp. v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., 844 F.3d 
414, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2012)) (“Section 19 . . . lays out a 
comprehensive oversight scheme whereby Congress gives the SEC the authority to 
supervise FINRA’s rules.”); see also Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372, 
374 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3, 78s (2012); Fiero v. Fin. Indus. 
Regulatory Auth., Inc., 660 F.3d 569, 571–72, 574 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
 31. Fiero, 660 F.3d at 571 (citing Maloney Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 
1070 (1938); Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
FINRA was created in 2007 as a consolidation of the National Association of Securities 
Dealers—the securities industry’s primary self-regulatory organization at the time—and 
the New York Stock Exchange’s “enforcement, arbitration, and member regulation arm.” 
Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68, 71 n.1 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 32. Virtually every circuit has so held. See, e.g., Picet Overseas Inc. v. Helvetia Tr., 
905 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W. Va. Univ. 
Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 2011)) (acknowledging FINRA’s comprehensive 
oversight authority); Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 90 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (citations omitted); Birkelbach v. SEC, 751 F.3d 472, 475 n.2 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(citing McDaniel v. Wells Fargo Invs., LLC, 717 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 2013)); 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing FINRA 
Bylaws, art. IV, § 1(a)) (stating “FINRA has instituted rules with which its members . . . 
agree to comply”); Birkelbach, 751 F.3d at 475 n.2 (citing McDaniel v. Wells Fargo Invs., 
LLC, 717 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 2013)); Fiero, 660 F.3d at 571 (citing Sacks v. SEC, 
648 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 2011)) (stating that “[a]s a practical matter, all securities firms 
dealing with the public must be members of FINRA.”); Karsner, 532 F.3d at 880 (quoting 
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803, 804 (D.C. Cir. 2005)) (stating that 
“FINRA, as NASD’s successor, is ‘the only officially registered national securities 
association.’”); Rodriguez v. Charles Schwab Corp., No. 12-cv-2277 JTF-TMP, 2013 
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a “quasi-governmental agency with express statutory [regulatory] 
authority.”33 Nearly all federal circuits have recognized FINRA’s 
regulatory authority, and none have rejected it.34 
                                                            
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33217, at *6 n.3 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 29, 2013) (citing P&M Corporate 
Fin., LLC v. Paparella, No. 2:10-cv-10448, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112907, at *1 (E.D. 
Mich. Oct. 22, 2010)) (stating “FINRA has established a set of rules which its industry 
members must follow.”). 
Notably, while still recognizing FINRA’s regulatory authority, the Second Circuit held 
FINRA lacks statutory authorization to judicially enforce penalties it assesses; however, 
it also affirmed FINRA’s authority to enforce sanctions by, inter alia, barring members 
from the securities industry, and seeking SEC enforcement in appropriate circumstances. 
Jonathan Macey & Caroline Novogrod, Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization’s 
Penalties and the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963, 970 n.42 (2012) 
(citing Fiero, 660 F.3d at 572). 
 33. Karsner, 532 F.3d at 880 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2012)). The Exchange 
Act requires FINRA to “provide a fair [disciplinary] procedure,” authorizes it to “initiate 
a disciplinary proceeding against any FINRA member or associated person for violating 
any FINRA rule, SEC regulation, or statutory provision,” and authorizes the SEC to 
“review a final disciplinary sanction imposed by FINRA.” Scottsdale, 844 F.3d at 424 
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(1) (2012)); Fiero, 660 F.3d at 572 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 
78s(h)(3)). The statutory scheme and FINRA rules combine to form a robust adjudicative 
and appellate process. First, FINRA issues and files a complaint; then, a panel hears the 
matter and issues a decision; the panel decision is appealable to FINRA’s National 
Adjudicatory Council (“NAC”); the NAC decision is appealable to the SEC; and the SEC 
decision is appealable to the United States Court of Appeals. See Macey & Novogrod, 
supra note 31, 970 n.42 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(8)). 
 34. See e.g., Picet, 905 F.3d at 1187; Bear Stearns, 900 F.3d at 90 n.1; Wiley v. SEC, 
663 Fed. Appx. 353, 356 n.1 (5th Cir. 2016); Birkelbach, 751 F.3d at 474–75; Goldman, 
747 F.3d at 749; Fiero, 660 F.3d at 571–72; UBS, 660 F.3d at 648; Karsner, 532 F.3d at 
880; Mscisz, 531 F.3d at 71 n.1. 
  The Eight and Tenth Circuits have not ruled on FINRA’s authority. The only 
relevant Sixth Circuit holding was an unreported decision recognizing FINRA’s 
authority. See Troszak v. SEC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 24259, at *1 (6th Cir. June 29, 
2016). Many district courts in these circuits have recognized FINRA’s authority and none 
have rejected it. See e.g., Balabon v. Ketchum, No. 1:17-CV-486-LY, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22098, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2018); Wilbanks Sec., Inc. v. Fin. Indus. 
Regulatory Auth., Inc., No. CIV-17-481-R, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71242, at *1–2 (W.D. 
Okla. May 10, 2017); Zola v. TD Ameritrade, Inc., 172 F. Supp.3d 1055, 1065 n.8 (D. 
Neb. Mar. 3, 2016); Klatte v. Buckman, Buckman & Reid, Inc., 995 F. Supp.2d 951, 953 
n.1 (D. Minn. 2014); Rodriguez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33217, No. 12-cv-2277 JTF-
TMP, at *2 n.3; Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Louise Silverman Tr., No. JFM-11-2533, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3870, at *1–2 n.1 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2012); Morgan Keegan & Co. v. 
Ras, No. 5:11-CV-352-KKC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150392, at *2–3 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 
14, 2011); Gilmore v. Brandt, No. 11-cv-00151-REB-KMT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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The Exchange Act requires FINRA to have rules that “provide for 
the enforcement of federal securities laws and [SEC] rules.”35 FINRA 
rules constitute federal securities laws as a result of its statutorily-created 
regulatory monopoly.36 The rules also require members to “make and 
preserve books and records as required under the FINRA rules, the 
Exchange Act and the applicable Exchange Act rules.”37 The rules also 
require members to maintain and preserve customer data, including new 
account information, updates to new account information, 
correspondence with customers, written records of customer complaints, 
and documents related to the allocation of option exercise assignment 
notices.38 
                                                            
125812, at *14 n.6 (D. Colo. Oct. 28, 2011); Empire Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Penson Fin. Servs., 
No. 3:09-CV-2155-D, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18782, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2010). 
 35. Sharemaster v. SEC, 847 F.3d 1059, 1062 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b)(6)–(8) 
(2012)) (9th Cir. 2017). 
 36. See Birkelbach, 751 F.3d at 475 n.2. FINRA’s de facto regulatory authority is a 
product of the SEC approval process. Because FINRA is a private entity, SEC approval 
is a necessary procedural safeguard against the private non-delegation doctrine, which 
generally bars delegation of rulemaking authority to private entities. See generally Emily 
Hammond, Double Deference in Administrative Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1705 (2016) 
(explaining the private non-delegation doctrine and FINRA’s relationship to the SEC). 
 37. FINRA, RULE 4511(a): GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, FINRA MANUAL (2011), 
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-
rules/4511?element_id=9957&rbid=2403 [https://perma.cc/VEZ4-B396]. 
 38. See FINRA, RULE 2360(b)(23)(C)(iii): OPTIONS, FINRA MANUAL (2019), 
available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2360 (requiring, 
at Rule 2360(b)(23)(C)(iii), preservation of documents related to the allocation of option 
exercise assignment notices); see also FINRA, RULE 2210(b)(2): COMMUNICATIONS WITH 
THE PUBLIC, FINRA MANUAL (2019), available at https://www.finra.org/rules-
guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2210 (stating that Rule 2210(b)(2) subjects 
correspondence, including correspondence with customers, to the supervision and review 
requirements of Rules 3110(b) and 3110.06–09); see also FINRA, RULE 3110(b)(5): 
SUPERVISION, FINRA MANUAL (2017), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/ 
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=11345 (stating that Rule 3110(b)(5) 
requires members’ Written Supervisory Procedures to “include procedures to capture . . 
. all written . . . customer complaints.”); see also FINRA, RULE 4513(a): RECORDS OF 
WRITTEN CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS, FINRA MANUAL (2011), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9959 
(requiring four-year retention of written customer complaints); see also FINRA, RULE 
4512(a): CUSTOMER ACCOUNT INFORMATION, FINRA MANUAL (2019), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9958 
(requiring maintenance and preservation of customer account information). 
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The SEC has authority under the Exchange Act to make rules 
requiring broker-dealers to “make and keep for prescribed periods . . . 
such records as necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the 
protection of investors” or to achieve the Act’s purposes.39 Using this 
authority, the SEC issued Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4, directing which records 
broker-dealers must make, how to make them, how to maintain them, and 
how long to retain them.40 SEC Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 derive statutory 
authority from Section 17a(1) of the Exchange Act.41 
SEC Rule 17a-4(f) requires broker-dealers to preserve electronic 
records “in a non-rewritable and non-erasable format.”42 This kind of 
format is called WORM storage, meaning “write once, read many.”43 To 
comply with Rule 17a-4, a broker-dealer’s storage system must do more 
than merely “mitigate the risk a record will be overwritten or erased.”44 
The system must make it impossible to “overwrite or erase records.”45 In 
addition, SEC Rule 17a-8 “requires broker-dealers to comply with the 
reporting, recordkeeping, and record retention rules” under the Bank 
Secrecy Act.46 
The SEC’s interpretive guidance on electronic storage of broker-
dealer records explains these rules’ purpose: 
                                                            
 39. SEC Interpretation, Electronic Storage of Broker-Dealer Records, 68 Fed. Reg. 
25281 (May 12, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-47806.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JV4L-Q8R7] (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1) (2012)). 
 40. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-3, 240.17a-4 (2019)). 
 41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1) (2012). 
 42. SEC Interpretation, Electronic Storage of Broker-Dealer Records, 68 Fed. Reg. 
at 25281 (May 12, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-47806.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JV4L-Q8R7]. 
 43. Jonathan Fiur, Deconstructing SEA FINRA 17a-4 (Worm Compliance), APRIMO: 
THE APRIMO BLOG (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.aprimo.com/blog/deconstructing-sea-
finra-17a-4-worm-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/MP5P-J83U]. 
 44. SEC Interpretation, Electronic Storage of Broker-Dealer Records, 68 Fed. Reg. 
at 25282 (May 12, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-47806.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JV4L-Q8R7]. 
 45. Id. (stating that “[a] broker-dealer would not violate the requirement in paragraph 
(f)(2)(ii)(A) of the rule if it used an electronic storage system that prevents the 
overwriting, erasing or otherwise altering of a record during its required retention period 
through the use of integrated hardware and software control codes.”). 
 46. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 
(AML) SOURCE TOOL FOR BROKER-DEALERS (2018), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ 
ocie/amlsourcetool.htm [https://perma.cc/XQU2-MHEQ] (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-8 
(2019)); see supra Part I.A.1 (explaining the Bank Secrecy Act). 
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These requirements are integral to the [SEC] investor protection 
function because the preserved records are the primary means of 
monitoring compliance with applicable securities laws, including 
antifraud provisions and financial responsibility standards. Recent 
events involving the deletion of emails by broker-dealers have 
affirmed the need to have measures in place to protect record 
integrity.47 
Congress has affirmed the importance of data preservation 
requirements. Senators Hollings, Wyden, and Sarbanes stated that “bank 
and other financial regulators need to require that records be retained in 
order that their examiners can insure the safety and soundness of the 
institutions and compliance with all relevant regulatory requirements.”48 
Essentially, regulators must be able to expect broker-dealers “to furnish 
promptly . . . legible, true and complete copies of those records” per 
regulator request.49 This public policy favoring data preservation is 
reflected in FINRA Rules 4511 and 8210.50 
FINRA Rule 4511 requires member firms to preserve books and 
records in a format compatible with SEC Rule 17a-4.51 FINRA Rule 8210 
requires member firms to comply with FINRA’s requests to “provide 
information . . . required to be [] maintained in electronic form” and to 
                                                            
 47. SEC Interpretation, Electronic Storage of Broker-Dealer Records, 68 Fed. Reg. 
at 25282 (May 12, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-47806.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JV4L-Q8R7]; see also SEC Interpretation: Commission Guidance to 
Broker-Dealers on the Use of Electronic Storage Media, 66 Fed. Reg. 22916, 22919 (May 
7, 2001) (stating that “Commission enforcement actions against unscrupulous broker-
dealers that improperly altered or destroyed records demonstrate the need for measures 
aimed at maintaining the integrity of broker-dealer records. These cases have included 
situations in which broker-dealer employers have changed or destroyed order tickets and 
other transactional records in an effort to shift firm losses to their customers or to conceal 
fraudulent activities.”). 
 48. SEC Interpretation: Commission Guidance to Broker-Dealers on the Use of 
Electronic Storage Media, 66 Fed. Reg. 22916, 22921 (May 1, 2001) (citing 146 CONG. 
REC. S5230 (daily ed. June 14, 2000) (statement of Sens. Hollings, Wyden, and 
Sarbanes)). 
 49. Id. at 22919. 
 50. See FINRA, RULE 4511(c): GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, FINRA MANUAL (2011), 
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-
rules/4511?element_id=9957&rbid=2403; see also FINRA, RULE 8210(a): PROVISION OF 
INFORMATION AND TESTIMONY AND INSPECTION AND COPYING OF BOOKS, FINRA 
MANUAL (2013), available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-
rules/8210. 
 51. FINRA, RULE 4511(c): GENERAL REQUIREMENTS, FINRA MANUAL (2011). 
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“provide information . . . [and] permit an inspection and copying of books, 
records, or accounts pursuant to this Rule.”52 
B. EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
The European Union is comprised of twenty-eight Member States 
and has many federal aspects to it.53 Two of its regulatory schemes are 
relevant to this Note. First is the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), which regulates processing of EU residents’ personal data.54 
Second is the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive.55 
1. General Data Protection Regulation 
The GDPR is a binding regulation.56 It replaced Directive 95/46/EC, 
the Data Protection Directive.57 GDPR Article 5(1) requires data 
processors, including financial institutions, to process personal data 
“lawfully.”58   Processing  is  a  technical  term  for  data  operations.59  It  
  
                                                            
 52. FINRA RULE 8210(a), (c): PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND TESTIMONY AND 
INSPECTION AND COPYING OF BOOKS, FINRA MANUAL (2013), available at 
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/8210. 
 53. Amy Verdun, The Federal Features of the EU: Lessons from Canada, 4 Pol. & 
Governance 100, 103–10 (2016). 
 54. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 1, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32 (EU). 
 55. Council Regulation 2014/65, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 173) (EC). 
 56. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU); see, e.g., 
Types of EU Law, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-
process/types-eu-law_en [https://perma.cc/T478-D95Z] (last visited Mar. 30, 2019); 
Regulations, Directives, and Other Acts, European Union, https://europa.eu/european-
union/eu-law/legal-acts_en [https://perma.cc/TX7Z-P3UG] (last visited Mar. 30, 2019); 
Applying EU Law, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-
process/applying-eu-law_en [https://perma.cc/3TZJ-4MFY] (last visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
Regulations are binding on their own; with directives, responsibility rests with Member 
States to enact their own implementing laws. 
 57. Emily Pehrsson, The Meaning of the GDPR Article 22, 31 STANFORD-VIENNA 
TRANSATLANTIC TECH. F. 1, 1 n.1 (2018). 
 58. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 5, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 35 (EU). 
 59. See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33 (EU). 
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includes collecting, storing, and using personal data.60 Article 6(1) 
provides six lawful grounds for processing.61 None of these six grounds 
recognize compliance with non-European law as a lawful basis for 
processing.62 
 
 
* * *  
                                                            
 60. Id. 
 61. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 6, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 36 (EU). 
 62. See id. The grounds at Article 6(1)(c)–(e) are clearly inapplicable to U.S. 
financial institutions. Article 6(1)(c) permits processing necessary to comply with legal 
obligations; this does not include obligations imposed by U.S. law, since Article 6(3) 
limits 6(1)(c) to obligations under either European Union or Member State law. Id. 
Similarly, Article 6(1)(e), which permits processing necessary to a task performed “in the 
exercise of official authority vested in the controller,” is inapplicable because Article 6(3) 
limits 6(1)(e) to the authority created by either European Union or Member State law. 
Article 6(1)(e) also permits processing necessary to a task performed “in the public 
interest.” Id. That prong is also inapplicable because of Article 6(3)’s limitation and 
because it only applies to public authorities or private entities established in EU Member 
States, not in third countries. Council Regulation 2016/679, recital 128, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 
24 (EU) (explaining that when public authorities or private bodies process data “in the 
public interest,” exclusive regulatory authority rests with the “supervisory authority of 
the Member State where the public authority or private body is established.”). Finally, 
Article 6(1)(d), which permits processing necessary to protect “vital interests” of the data 
subject or a natural person, is inapplicable to U.S. financial institutions because “vital 
interests” refers to interests which are “essential for the life of the data subject or . . . 
another natural person.” Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 6, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 36 (EU); 
Council Regulation 2016/679, recital 46, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 8–9 (EU). Financial data is 
not “essential for the life” of any person. 
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Article 17 governs the right to erasure.63 It requires compliance with 
procedurally valid erasure demands.64 Understanding erasure requires an 
                                                            
 63. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU). Article 17 
has three sections. Id. Section 1 requires controllers to fulfill erasure orders from 
customers when any one of a disjunctive set of six grounds for erasure applies. Id. Section 
2 governs the right to erasure when the controller has made personal data public and is 
thus outside the scope of this note.  Id. at 44. Section 3 provides five exceptions to 
Sections 1 and 2. Id. at 44. The exceptions under Sections 17(3)(a)–(d) do not apply to 
financial institutions processing customer data. 17(3)(a) and 17(3)(c), respectively, 
provide exceptions for “freedom of expression and information” and “reasons of public 
health.” Certainly these do not apply to financial institutions processing unpublished 
customer personal financial data. See id. 17(3)(d) provides an exception for “archiving 
purposes” consisted with Article 89, but as Article 89 makes clear, this applies to public 
archives of historical information, so it does not apply private data retention. Council 
Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU); Council Regulation 
2016/679, art. 89, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 84–85 (EU). Section 17(3)(b) provides an exception 
where processing is necessary for compliance with European Union or Member State 
obligations or “for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the 
exercise of official authority vested in the controller.” Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 
17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 44 (EU). The public interest prong is inapplicable to United States 
financial institutions since it only applies to public authorities or private entities 
established in EU Member States, not in third countries. See discussion supra note 60. 
Notably, a litigant might argue that processing by a FINRA member firm constitutes an 
exercise of official authority. However, this argument is severely flawed and, in any 
event, fails to resolve the conflict. The GDPR defines “controller” to include a “legal 
person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, 
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.” Given FINRA’s 
dual status, a litigant could argue that FINRA’s role as a “quasi-governmental agency” 
vests it with authority under the Maloney Act, while its role as a professional association 
for securities firms (especially considering the related contractual nature of FINRA 
membership) qualifies it as acting jointly with its members to determine the purposes and 
means of processing. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (explaining FINRA). There are 
three problems with this argument. First, it presupposes that the term “official authority” 
as used in Section 17(3)(b) includes non-European authorities. Second, even if “official 
authority” does contemplate non-European authorities, it does not necessarily include 
FINRA specifically. The facts that FINRA is not a state actor and lacks judicial 
enforcement power militate against such a conclusion. See Hammond, supra note 35, at 
1728 (explaining that FINRA is not a state actor); see also Macey & Novogrod, supra 
note 31, 965 n.42 (citing Fiero v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., 660 F.3d 569, 572 
(2d Cir. 2011) (explaining the Second Circuit’s holding that FINRA does not have 
judicial enforcement power)). Third, even if a litigant prevails on this argument, the 
17(3)(b) exception only resolves the conflict with respect to FINRA rules. SEC Rules 
17a-3 and 17a-4 still apply to securities firms regardless of their relationship with FINRA. 
See discussion supra Part I.A.2. Additionally, this theory only addresses the conflict 
between the GDPR and United States securities law; banking law is entirely unaffected. 
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understanding of Article 6(1)’s consent and legitimate interest grounds. If 
neither apply, data processing is unlawful ab initio and subject to 
mandatory erasure under Article 17(1)(d) absent a 17(3)(e) litigation 
exception.65 
Article 6(1)(f) permits processing if the data processor’s “legitimate 
interests” are not overridden by the customer’s “interests or fundamental 
rights and freedoms . . . which require protection of personal data.”66 
Legitimate interests do not include U.S. legal obligations for two reasons. 
First, strict limitation of Article 6(1)(c)’s “legal obligation” basis to 
European Union and Member State law suggests that the GDPR 
contemplates foreclosing on non-European legal obligations as 
exceptions to the GDPR’s statutory scheme.67 Second, even if U.S. legal 
                                                            
 64. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU). 
 65. Id. Section 17(3)(e) provides an exception to Section 1’s erasure requirements 
when processing is necessary “for the establishment, exercise or [defense] of legal 
claims.” Id. In other words, a 17(3)(e) exception lets financial institutions prevent 
spoliation of evidence and comply with litigation holds. See Margaret Rouse & Stephen 
J. Bigelow,  
Litigation Hold (Preservation Orders or Hold Orders), SEARCH STORAGE (July, 2007) 
https://searchstorage.techtarget.com/definition/litigation-hold [https://perma.cc/99HZ-
RD3C] (explaining litigation holds and spoliation); Stephanie F. Stacy, Litigation Holds: 
Ten Tips in Ten Minutes, BAYLOR, EVNEN, CURTISS, GRIMIT & WITT, LLP 
https://www.ned.uscourts.gov/internetDocs/cle/2010-07/LitigationHoldTopTen.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P28W-ZYEP] (last visited Mar. 31, 2019). So, a United States financial 
institution faces no conflict regarding data relevant to ongoing or anticipated litigation. 
Therefore, this note focuses on resolving the conflict outside the narrow context of a 
17(3)(e) exception. 
 66. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 6, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 36 (EU). 
 67. See id. The fact that this limitation is stated explicitly and in a separate section 
further supports this conclusion. See id. (providing the “legal obligation” basis in Section 
1 and stating the limitation in Section 3). Further, Article 23(1) explicitly allows the 
European Union and Member States to restrict the “scope of the obligations and rights . 
. . .” provided in Articles 17 and 18 for specifically enumerated purposes. Council 
Regulation 2016/679, art. 23, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 46 (EU). Article 23(1)’s explicit 
statement “Union or Member State” indicates that non-European states cannot derogate 
the GDPR. See id. In addition, one of enumerated purposes refers to derogation necessary 
to safeguard “a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected . . . to the 
exercise of official authority.” Id. at 47. The fact that Article 23 thus validates Member 
States law establishing regulatory schemes in derogation of the GDPR indicates that it 
does not also validate non-European regulatory schemes, since the drafters clearly 
contemplated exceptions for regulatory schemes and chose to limit such exceptions to 
those under European law. 
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obligations do constitute a legitimate interest, they will be overridden by 
the right to erasure, which the European Union considers fundamental.68 
Article 6(1)(a) permits data processing when the customer consents 
thereto, subject to the conditions for consent under Article 7.69 Article 
17(1)(b) requires erasure when processing relies on Article 6(1)(a) 
consent, the demanding customer withdraws that consent, and “there is 
                                                            
 68. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain, S.L. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 317 (calling the right to erasure a “fundamental right”). When 
balancing legitimate interests, the GDPR’s recitals direct consideration of whether, ab 
initio, the data subject “can reasonably expect” the purpose for which their data will be 
processed. Council Regulation 2016/679, recital 47, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 9 (EU). Since the 
purpose of the U.S. data retention requirements is to preserve access to data for 
unforeseen future purposes, customers of United States financial institutions cannot 
reasonably expect, when the financial institution collects their personal data, the purpose 
for which it will be used. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text; see also 
discussion supra Part I.A. 
 69. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 6, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 36–37 (EU); Council 
Regulation 2016/679, art. 7, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 37 (EU). A financial institution might 
include a consent clause in its standard customer agreements. Is a consent clause in an 
adhesion contract a valid demonstration of consent under Articles 6(1)(a) in light of the 
Article 7 conditions? Without resolving this issue, which is beyond the scope of this note, 
the issue itself is relevant when examining Article 17’s erasure requirements. If resolving 
this issue points to 6(1)(a) not permitting United States financial institutions to process 
European customers’ personal data, and Article 6(1)(f) does not permit processing, then 
Article 17(1)(d) (requiring erasure of unlawfully processed data) automatically applies 
since the processing was unlawful ab initio. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 
O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU). If resolving the issue points to 6(1)(a) permitting processing, 
then Article 17(1)(b) requires erasure if the customer withdraws consent and “no other 
legal ground for processing” applies. Id. In that case, the legitimate interest issue becomes 
apposite. If, as this note concludes, Article 6(1)(f) does not extend to U.S. legal 
obligations, then a 17(1)(b) demand requires erasure and thus conflicts with U.S. law. 
See supra note 64 and accompanying text (rejecting Article 6(1)(f)’s inclusion of United 
States legal obligations as a lawful basis for processing). Regardless of whether Article 
6(1)(f) does or does not initially permit processing, a customer can still demand erasure 
by raising a particularized Article 21(1) objection to pursuant to Article 17(1)(c), because 
an erasure demand at the interstices of Articles 17(1)(c) and 21(1) raises the standard of 
lawfulness from “legitimate interest” to “compelling legitimate interest.” Council 
Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU); Council Regulation 
2016/679, art. 21, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 45–46 (EU). Even if the legitimate interest can 
encompass United States legal obligations, based a fortiori on the same argument, supra, 
against applying Article 6(1)(f)’s “legitimate interest” clause, the higher “compelling 
legitimate interest” test would militate against permitting processing. See Council 
Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU); Council Regulation 
2016/679, art. 21, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 45–46 (EU). 
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no other legal ground for the processing.”70 Article 7(3) conditions 
consent on the customer being able “to withdraw his or her consent at any 
time” as easily as first given.71 Thus, while consent may provide an initial 
lawful basis for processing, its withdrawal vitiates that lawful basis and 
puts the GDPR in conflict with U.S. law. The Article 7 conditions also 
raise the issue of whether consent is actually valid in the first instance.72 
Regardless, the issue is beyond this Note’s scope because consent is the 
only applicable Article 6(1) lawful basis.73 Therefore, if a financial 
institution falls short of Article 7’s conditions for consent, erasure can be 
compelled under Article 17(1)(d); if the institution passes Article 7 
muster, erasure can be required under Article 17(1)(b) when consent is 
withdrawn.74 
                                                            
 70. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU). Article 
17(1)(b) also requires erasure when consent was given under Article 9(2)(a), which is 
irrelevant to this note because 9(2)(a) lets data subjects waive the Article 9(1) prohibition 
on personal data about “racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, . . . genetic data, biometric data for the 
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health . . . [and a natural 
person’s] sex life or sexual orientation.” Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 9, 2016 O.J. 
(L 119) 38 (EU). United States financial law does not require maintenance or preservation 
of any of these categories of data. See generally supra Part I.A (discussing the 
requirements imposed by United States financial law). 
 71. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 7, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 37 (EU). 
 72. For example, the GDPR’s recitals state a presumption that consent is not freely 
given when “the performance of a contract . . . is dependent on the consent despite such 
consent not being necessary for such performance.” Council Regulation 2016/679, recital 
43, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 8 (EU). 
 73. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 6, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 36 (EU). Note that even 
if, for argument’s sake, an Article 6(1)(f) “legitimate interest” provide a lawful basis, the 
standard to overcome an Article 17(1)(c) erasure demand is clearly higher. See Council 
Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU). Under Article 17(1)(c), a 
data subject can demand erasure by raising an Article 21(1) objection “on grounds 
relating to his or her particular situation” when processing is based no Article 6(1)(f). 
Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 21, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 45 (EU); see also Council 
Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 43–44 (EU). Absent a litigation 
exception identical to Article 17(3)(e), a controller must demonstrate that its “compelling 
legitimate grounds for the processing . . . override the interests, rights and freedoms of 
the data subject.” Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 21, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 45 (EU) 
(emphasis added). The burden of persuasion in a “compelling legitimate grounds” 
balancing test rests with the controller. Council Regulation 2016/679, recital 69, 2016 
O.J. (L 119) 13 (EU). 
 74. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing Article 17(1)(b)); supra 
note 63 and accompanying text (discussing Article 17(1)(d)). 
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2. Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID) requires 
financial services companies to store communications related to business 
transactions for seven years.75 MiFID applies to financial institutions 
“providing investment services or performing investment activities 
through the establishment of a branch in the Union.”76 Though MiFID’s 
recordkeeping requirements do not apply to U.S. financial institutions, 
they warrant discussion for their relevance to the balancing test, which is 
discussed infra.77 Specifically, MiFID’s recordkeeping requirements 
suggest the European Union has recognized, in a limited context, the same 
public policy as U.S. regulators.78 For example, MiFID Recital 57 states 
that: 
Recording of telephone conversations or electronic communications 
involving client orders is compatible with the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (the Charter) and is justified in order to 
strengthen investor protection, to improve market surveillance and 
increase legal certainty in the interest of investment firms and their 
clients.79 
C. JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE 
A state’s jurisdiction to prescribe is its “authority to make its 
substantive laws applicable to particular persons and circumstances.”80 
                                                            
 75. Shaun Hurst, Five Lessons to Learn from MiFID II, SMARSH (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.smarsh.com/blog/five-lessons-to-learn-from-mifid-ii/ 
[https://perma.cc/A3JR-8FXK]. 
 76. Council Regulation 2014/65, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 41 (EC). 
 77. See discussion infra Parts II and III. 
 78. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing public policy considerations of SEC Rules 17a-
3 and 17a-4). 
 79. Council Regulation 2014/65, recital 57, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 25 (EC). 
 80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., Part IV, 
Introductory Note (AM. LAW INST. 1987). Jurisdiction to prescribe is one of three classes 
of jurisdiction in conflict of law analysis; the other two are jurisdiction to enforce and 
jurisdiction to adjudicate. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
U.S. § 401; see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
U.S., PART IV (regarding jurisdiction in foreign relations law). Jurisdiction to prescribe 
must exist before examining jurisdiction to adjudicate or enforce. See Denis T. Rice and 
Julia Gladstone, An Assessment of the Effects Test in Determining Personal Jurisdiction 
in Cyberspace, 58 BUS. L. 601, 603 (2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 401). Jurisdiction to enforce refers to a state’s power to 
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States may exercise jurisdiction outside their own territory,81 referred to 
as “extra territorial jurisdiction.”82 International law approaches 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in two ways.83 The prohibitive principles 
approach generally grants jurisdiction unless a contrary rule prohibits it.84 
The permissive principles approach only grants jurisdiction that is 
specifically provided for.85 Essentially, the permissive approach tells 
states when they have jurisdiction, and the prohibitive approach tells them 
when they do not. 
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States summarizes and influences U.S. law on which jurisdiction to 
prescribe.86 It adopts a permissive principles approach.87 Section 402 
                                                            
“employ judicial or nonjudicial measures to induce or compel compliance or punish 
noncompliance with its laws or regulations, provided it has jurisdiction to prescribe.” Id. 
at 604 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 431(1)). 
This Note discusses both jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce. By way of 
background, jurisdiction to adjudicate refers to tribunal’s power to “resolve a dispute in 
respect to a person or thing where the country has jurisdiction to prescribe the law that is 
sought to be enforced.” Id. at 603 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE U.S., CHAPTER 2, INTRODUCTORY NOTE); see also Stephanie M. Chaissan, 
Note, “Minimum Contacts” Abroad: Using the International Shoe Test to Restrict the 
Extraterritorial Exercise of United States Jurisdiction under the Maritime Drug Law 
Enforcement Act, 38 UNIV. OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 641, 648 (2007) (citing 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 421) (explaining adjudicative jurisdiction in 
conflict of laws analysis by comparison to International Shoe’s “minimum contacts” 
standard for state courts exercise of personal jurisdiction over other states’ citizens in 
U.S. law). 
 81. See generally R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
 82. See generally id.; Watson v. Emps Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 70 
(1954). 
 83. CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2d ed. 2008). 
 84. See id. at 23–25 (quoting S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A) No. 10, at 18–19 (Sept. 7)) (stating an argument for the prohibitive principles 
approach, i.e., that “[t]he rules of law binding upon States . . . emanate from their own 
free will” and “restrictions upon the independence of states cannot therefore be 
presumed.”). 
 85. Id. at 21. 
 86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 402–03 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403 cmt. a 
(describing the jurisdictional links in § 402 as “generally necessary.”). Customary 
international law also follows the permissive principles approach. See Ryngaert, supra 
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provides when states have jurisdiction to prescribe, subject to § 403’s 
restraints.88 While they are not controlling authority, U.S. federal courts 
often cite these sections.89 Congress can regulate extraterritorially by 
clearly indicating its intent to so regulate.90 It can also choose to override 
international law.91 
This section outlines the Restatement’s permissive rules for 
jurisdiction to prescribe. It also examines the grounds on which the United 
States and European Union have prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe. The 
next section examines whether each state actually exercises its 
jurisdiction, given that having jurisdiction is not the same as exercising 
it.92 
                                                            
note 81, at 27 (stating “[u]nder the customary international law of jurisdiction . . . 
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction is arguably prohibited in the absence of a 
permissive rule.”). Arguably, international law is part of United States foreign relations 
law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 1(a); see also 
Ryngaert, supra note 81, at 41 (citing The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) 
(holding that “[i]nternational law is part of our law.”)). 
 88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402. 
 89. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. V. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165–66 
(2004); Mujica v. AirScan, Inc. 771 F.3d 580, 603–04 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 
1, 22 (1st Cir. 2008); BP Chems. Ltd. V. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 
266 (3d Cir. 2000); Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 188 F. Supp.3d 734, 757 (N.D. 
Ill. 2016) (noting “courts ordinarily employ” § 403’s interest balancing test); NML 
Capital, Ltd. V. Republic of Arg., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30625, at *46 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
12, 2015) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895)) (noting the Second 
Circuit suggestion to address the § 403 factors). 
 90. Equal Emp’ Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 
(1991) (hereinafter “EEOC”). 
 91. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that a 
United States statute “simply modifies or supersedes customary international law” insofar 
as it is inconsistent with international law); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp.2d 
189, 214 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2000)) (stating “[i]t is well established that Congress has 
the power to override international law” and the presumption that Congress “generally 
intends its statutes to be consistent with international law” is rebuttable by “a clear 
statement of intent to override international law.”). 
 92. See discussion infra Part I.D. 
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1. Restatement Provisions 
Section 402 states five bases for jurisdiction to prescribe,93 three of 
which rest on “links of territoriality.”94 A state has jurisdiction over 
conduct that happens “wholly or in substantial part” in its territory; 
conduct abroad that “has or is intended to have substantial effect” therein; 
and “the status of persons, or interests in things” therein.95 The fourth 
basis rests on nationality.96 A state has jurisdiction over “the activities, 
interests, status, or relations of its nationals” anywhere in the world.97 
Jurisdiction must rely on one of these bases and must be reasonable under 
§ 403.98 Section 403 determines reasonableness “by evaluating all 
relevant factors, including” the eight listed in § 403(2).99 
2. United States Jurisdiction to Prescribe 
When U.S. financial institutions do business with EU customers, the 
United States has jurisdiction no matter where the transactions occur. 
Accordingly, the United States has jurisdiction over foreign transactions 
since these have a substantial effect on U.S. financial markets.100 In 
addition to the “links of territoriality” bases, the United States has 
jurisdiction arising from the financial institutions’ “nationality” as U.S. 
institutions.101 
                                                            
 93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402. 
 94. Id. § 402 cmt. a. 
 95. Id. § 402(1). 
 96. Id. § 402 cmt. a. 
 97. Id. § 402(2). While the Restatement also discusses the “protective” and “passive 
personality” principles as jurisdictional bases, these are not relevant to the present topic. 
See id. § 402 cmt. e, cmt. g; see also United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp.2d 189, 196 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2000) (discussing the protective and passive personality principles). 
After passing the first step of the Section 402 inquiry, reasonableness is determined under 
Section 403 “by evaluating all relevant factors, including” the eight listed in Section 
403(2). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 403(1)–(2) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also discussion infra Part II. 
 98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403. 
 99. Id. § 403(2); see also discussion infra Part II. 
 100. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402(1)). 
 101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402(2) 
(providing that a state has jurisdiction over “the activities . . . or relations of its 
nationals.”). 
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If applying U.S. data preservation rules when U.S. financial 
institutions do business with European customers would constitute an 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, then the issue of whether the 
United States actually exercises such jurisdiction depends on the 
Morrison-Kiobel analysis, discussed infra.102 
3. European Union Jurisdiction to Prescribe 
The Restatement is not binding in European courts. European law 
provides the jurisdictional rules in Europe. When EU conflict of law rules 
apply EU substantive law, analysis of jurisdiction to prescribe would be 
immaterial in European court proceedings.103 Therefore, this section 
focuses on the application of U.S. jurisdictional rules in U.S. courts. 
European Union Member State courts will follow their own choice 
of law rules. If a Member State’s rules point to applying U.S. law, then 
there is no conflict. More likely, though, member state courts would apply 
GDPR. Part III.C addresses this situation. 
When litigated in U.S. courts, a court would first test whether the 
European Union has jurisdiction to prescribe—as that concept is 
understood in U.S. foreign relations law.104 A U.S. court would likely find 
that the European Union has jurisdiction to prescribe laws respecting its 
Member States’ citizens interactions with U.S. financial institutions, 
either based on nationality jurisdiction, or on status-based territorial 
jurisdiction. The European Union could exercise nationality jurisdiction 
because transactions with its Member States’ citizens involve “the 
activities, interests . . . or relations of its nationals” regardless of where 
the transactions happen.105 It could exercise status-based territorial 
jurisdiction because a European’s transactions with a U.S. financial 
institution affect the “status of persons, or interests in things” within the 
European Union.106 To wit, the transaction would affect the status of the 
European customers (persons) and their financial assets (things). The 
European Union likely cannot exercise objective territorial jurisdiction 
because doing so requires finding that the transactions were intended to 
                                                            
 102. See discussion infra Part I.D.1. 
 103. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 104. See discussion supra Part I.C.1. 
 105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402(2) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 106. Id. § 402(1)(b). 
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have an effect on European persons and markets.107 Proving a financial 
institution had such intent would be very difficult. 
D. ACTUAL EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE 
Jurisdiction allows a state to regulate but does not require it to do 
so.108 The analysis does not end merely because the United States and the 
European Union both have jurisdiction under sections 402 and 403. A 
conflict only exists if both actually exercise their jurisdiction. This section 
discusses United States exercise of jurisdiction under the Morrison-
Kiobel framework109 and European Union exercise of jurisdiction under 
GDPR Article 3. 
1. United States 
United States courts determine a law’s extraterritorial reach using the 
Morrison-Kiobel two-step analysis,110 which relies on a canon of statutory 
construction called the presumption against extraterritoriality.111 Under 
the presumption against extraterritoriality, courts presume that 
Congressional statutes and the regulations thereunder do not apply 
outside the United States unless “the statute demonstrates Congress’ 
‘affirmative inten[t]’ that the law should apply” extraterritorially.112 
Step One asks whether Congress clearly and affirmatively rebutted 
the presumption.113 If a court concludes that it did, the statute applies 
outside the United States, subject to any limits Congress explicated.114 A 
“yes” at Step One signals that Congress exercised its jurisdiction to 
prescribe. 
                                                            
 107. See id. § 402(1)(c). 
 108. See discussion supra Part I.C (defining jurisdiction to prescribe). 
 109. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2093–94 (2016) (citing 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. 
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 2112 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). 
 112. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing EEOC, 499 U.S. 248). 
 113. Id. at 2101. 
 114. Id. 
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A regulation’s extraterritorial reach derives from that of its 
authorizing statute.115 If the statute fails Step One, so does the 
regulation.116 So, whether Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 apply extraterritorially 
depends on whether Exchange Act § 17 applies extraterritorially. 
Morrison held that §§ 10(b) and 30(b) did not apply extraterritorially.117 
Though each section of the Exchange Act must be analyzed separately, 
federal courts have not found § 17 to apply extraterritorially since 
Morrison was decided.118 
If the answer is no at Step One, the court can still find that Congress 
exercised jurisdiction under Morrison-Kiobel or Step Two.119 This step 
asks whether the case involves a “domestic application” of the law.120 If 
it does, the statute and its regulations govern the conduct at issue.121 
Courts answer this question by identifying the conduct that is relevant to 
the statute’s focus.122 If the conduct “occurred in the United States, then 
the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct 
occurred abroad.”123 The issue then is whether the conduct relevant to the 
Exchange Act’s focus occurred in the United States.124 This is “essentially 
an inquiry into whether the domestic contacts are sufficient to avoid 
triggering the presumption at all.”125 
                                                            
 115. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261–62 (2010) (citing 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)) (holding that the regulation at issue 
in Morrison, Rule 10b-5, “does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by § 10(b)’s 
prohibition.”). 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 261–65 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b)) (holding that Exchange Act § 30(b) 
does not apply extraterritorially). 
 118. See id.; see also R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2108 
(2016) (applying the presumption separately to the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act’s substantive prohibitions and its private right of action). 
 119. See Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 216 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266–70 (2010); Mastafa v. Chevron 
Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 182 (2d Cir. 2014); Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 
272–73 (2d Cir. 2014); Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 337 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
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Legislative history indicates that the focus of Exchange Act § 17 is 
on preserving data so regulators can enforce securities laws.126 This 
policy, viewed in light of the Exchange Act’s comprehensive regulatory 
framework for U.S. securities markets, indicates that data preservation is 
domestic in nature. Section 17’s relevant conduct is clearly data 
preservation.127 What constitutes preservation can be interpreted in two 
ways. If the relevant conduct is the act of storing data, then storing it on 
systems and networks in the United States is domestic in nature. If the 
relevant conduct is instead interpreted as refraining from deletion, then 
the internal decision by a U.S. business to refrain is domestic in nature. 
For this same reason, the data preservation requirements in banking law 
are also domestic in nature. Under the Morrison-Kiobel analysis, U.S. 
financial law applies to the situations this Note addresses.128 
2. European Union 
GDPR Article 3 applies the regulation’s substantive provisions in 
two ways—on an “establishment” basis and on a global basis.129 Article 
3(1)—establishment application—applies the GDPR “to the processing 
of personal data in the context of the activities of an establishment of a 
controller or a processor in the Union, regardless of whether the 
processing takes place in the Union or not.”130 Article 3(2)—global 
application—applies the GDPR “to the processing of personal data of data 
subjects who are in the Union” by institutions outside the European Union 
who either enter its stream of commerce or monitor the behavior of 
European customers.131 The latter form, based on a stream of commerce 
application, applies worldwide.132 
                                                            
 126. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text (explaining Congress’ and the 
SEC’s positions that the mandatory data preservation scheme promotes regulatory 
certainty and market integrity). 
 127. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 48 Stat. 881 
(1934). 
 128. See R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2093–94 (2016) 
(citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroluem Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)). 
 129. See Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 3, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32–33 (EU). 
 130. Id. (emphasis added). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Una Dean & Melis S. Kiziltay Carter, New Guidelines on GDPR’s 
Territorial Scope Confirm It Reaches Far Beyond the EU, N.Y. L. J. (Mar. 4, 2019),  
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E. IDENTIFYING THE CONFLICT 
The European Union and the United States both potentially exercise 
their respective jurisdictions to prescribe, with conflicting prescriptions. 
This calls for a resolution. Part II examines the doctrinal framework for 
that resolution: the interest balancing test under U.S. foreign relations law 
and customary international law. Part III examines and balances each 
state’s interests to determine which state has a stronger interest in 
regulating financial institutions’ data processing. It also addresses the 
enforceability of foreign judgments ordering U.S. financial institutions to 
erase data under the GDPR. 
II. CONFLICT 
A. LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 
United States conflict of law rules rely on a three-step analysis of 
jurisdiction to prescribe.133 The first step examines whether the state has 
a legal basis for jurisdiction under the permissive rules of section 402 of 
Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States.134 
Second, exercising jurisdiction must be reasonable under Section 
403(2).135 Third, if two states with conflicting prescriptions can 
reasonably exercise jurisdiction, an interest balancing test is used to 
determine which state’s law should control.136 
1. Rule of Reasonableness 
Section 403(2) is a non-exhaustive list of eight factors for 
determining the reasonableness of a state’s exercise of jurisdiction to 
prescribe under Section 402.137 Federal courts frequently rely on 
Restatement Sections 402 and 403.138 The Section 403 factors are: 
                                                            
https://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/NYLJ_Dean_Kiziltay%20Carter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8KRZ-4783]. 
 133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 402–03 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 134. Id. § 402. 
 135. Id. § 403(2). 
 136. Id. § 403(3). 
 137. Id. §§ 403(2), 403 cmt. b. 
 138. See supra note 87. 
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the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the 
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has 
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; 
the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, 
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for 
the activity to be regulated, or between the state and those whom the 
regulation is designed to protect; 
the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the 
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states 
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of 
such regulation is generally accepted; 
the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt 
by the regulation; 
the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or 
economic system; 
the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of 
the international system; 
the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating 
the activity; and 
the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.139 
As explained in Part III, each state has at least some reasonable basis 
for exercising jurisdiction. Resolving the issue centers around the interest 
balancing test, which is discussed below. 
2. Interest Balancing Test 
Under Section 403, when two states can reasonably exercise 
jurisdiction to prescribe, courts must conduct an interest balancing test 
using the reasonableness factors of Section 403(2).140 The state with the 
                                                            
 139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403(2). 
 140. Id. In United States foreign relations law, comity considerations are independent 
of Morrison-Kiobel analysis. Comity in United States courts dates back to the Supreme 
Courts’ decision in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, where the court adopted 
the canon that an act of Congress “ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations if any other possible construction remains.” Murray v. The Schooner Charming 
Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). This was the first time this canon appeared in a Supreme 
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weaker interest should defer to the state with the stronger interest.141 This 
responsibility belongs to whichever court, in the United States, hears the 
dispute. It is not a negotiation between the two states whose laws conflict. 
The Restatement’s interest balancing test does not apply in European 
courts. 
B. LITIGATION IN EUROPEAN COURTS 
GDPR provides two enforcement mechanisms. Article 79 provides 
for judicial enforcement by granting data subjects a private right of 
action.142 Proceedings by EU customers against financial institutions must 
be brought in Member State courts.143 Articles 57 and 58 provides for 
administrative enforcement by Member States’ supervisory authorities144 
and requires supervisory authorities to “monitor and enforce [the 
GDPR’s] application” in their territories.145 Article 58 provides, in 
relevant part: 
Each supervisory authority shall have . . . corrective powers: 
to order the controller or the processor to comply with the data 
subject’s requests to exercise his or her rights pursuant to this 
Regulation; 
to order the controller or processor to bring processing operations into 
compliance with the provisions of this Regulation . . .; 
to order the . . . erasure of personal data . . . pursuant to Article[] 17 . 
. .; 
to impose an administrative fine pursuant to Article 83 . . . 
                                                            
Court decision, but the canon was far from novel—it dates back to twelfth-century Italy. 
See Ryngaert, supra note 81, 46–47. Comity is “the recognition which one nation allows 
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having 
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens 
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 
113, 164 (1895). The interest balancing test is a form of comity analysis. 
 141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403(3). 
 142. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 79, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 80 (EU). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Council Regulation 2016/679, arts. 57–58, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 68–70 (EU). 
 145. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 57, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 68 (EU). 
2019] RECONCILING U.S. AND EU 225 
DATA REGULATIONS 
The exercise of the powers conferred on the supervisory authority 
pursuant to this Article shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, 
including effective judicial remedy and due process, set out in Union 
and Member State law in accordance with the Charter.146 
If a Member State court issues a judgment against a U.S. financial 
institution—either to affirm an administratively imposed penalty under 
Article 58, or to adjudicate an Article 57 private action—U.S. law will 
determine the judgments’ enforceability in the United States.147 In an 
analogous case, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et 
L’Antisemitisme, the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce a French judgment 
against a U.S. technology service provider.148 Notably, the Ninth Circuit 
declined to reach the First Amendment issue, instead ruling the case was 
not ripe for decision.149 However, in dicta, the Ninth Circuit adopted the 
Restatement’s rule that “an American court will not enforce a judgment 
if the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the judgment 
itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the United States.”150 Mere 
inconsistency between the foreign judgment and U.S. law is insufficient 
to constitute repugnancy.151 
Part III.C advocates for applying the repugnancy approach to EU 
Member State judgments against U.S. financial institutions for violating 
GDPR’s erasure requirements.152 
Two standards of repugnancy are relevant for purposes of this Note. 
Under the first, “[e]xtreme, intolerable differences” give rise to a “public 
policy exception,” whereby national courts may refuse to enforce foreign 
judgments “on the grounds of inconsistency with national public 
                                                            
 146. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 58, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 
 147. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.3d 909, 937 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (“But no nation can expect its laws to reach further than its jurisdiction to 
prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce. Every nation must often rely on other countries to help 
it achieve its regulatory expectations.”). 
 148. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme (Yahoo! 
France), 433 F.3d 1199, 1253 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 149. Id. at 1221. 
 150. Id. at 1213–14 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE U.S. § 482(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1971)). 
 151. See id. at 1214. 
 152. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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policy.”153 This comports with the rule that mere inconsistency of law 
does not constitute repugnancy, since this standard requires (a) that such 
differences be both extreme and intolerable, and (b) that the inconsistency 
be not just of laws but also of national public policies. Second, a “common 
formulation” of repugnancy weighs public policy concerns against 
comity. Comity generally directs national courts to enforce foreign 
judgments, except “where the original claim is repugnant to fundamental 
notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is 
sought.”154 This Note refers to these three standards, respectively, as the 
“extreme, intolerable differences” standard and the “fundamental 
notions” standard.  
III. RESOLUTION 
A. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT WITH RESPECT TO U.S. SECURITIES LAW  
WHEN LITIGATED IN U.S. COURTS 
1. Identifying and Analyzing Each States’ Interests 
Ultimately, courts should balance the United States’ and European 
Union’s interests. First, then, this analysis must identify those interests 
with respect to securities law. 
a. Link of Activity to Regulating State’s Territory 
Section 403(2)(a) directs consideration of “the link of the activity to 
the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity 
takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct and foreseeable 
effect upon or in the territory.”155 
Regarding the extent to which the activity occurs in the regulating 
state’s territory, as discussed in Part I, data processing occurs in the 
United States.156 While the underlying financial transaction can be 
                                                            
 153. Alex Mills, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORDERING OF PRIVATE LAW 16 n.46, 257 (Cambridge Univ. Press, ed., 2009). 
 154. Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 177 (2004) 
(citing Will of Brown, 505 N.Y.S.2d 334, 341 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986)). 
 155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402(2). 
 156. See discussion supra Part II.D (discussing the Morrison-Kiobel Step Two 
analysis). 
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considered as occurring partially in both states, the regulated conduct is 
not the transaction, but the treatment data arising therefrom. The United 
States has a stronger territorial link to the conduct taking place within its 
borders, since data processing is performed by securities firms in the 
United States. 
Next is the issue of effect. Weighing where there would be a 
foreseeable effect is ultimately unhelpful, since the effect on market 
integrity in the United States and the effect on data privacy in the 
European Union would both be foreseeable. This leaves the inquiry to 
focus on which effect is more substantial or direct. The effect on the 
United States would be more substantial, because market integrity affects 
every participant in U.S. capital markets. By contrast, data retention 
would only affect the privacy interests of the narrow class of European 
customers who demand erasure. That said, for the same reason, the effect 
on those European customers would be more direct than the abstract effect 
on market integrity. 
As to the effects, foreseeability is unhelpful, as the “substantial” 
prong weighs towards U.S. law, and the “direct” prong weighs toward EU 
law. So, the effects consideration is a wash overall. Therefore, 
considering the 403(2)(a) factors, the “extent” prong weighs towards U.S. 
securities law, so the 403(2)(a) analysis overall points toward the United 
States having a stronger interest. 
b. Connections Between Regulating States and Principally Responsible 
Party 
Section 403(2)(b) directs consideration of “the connections, such as 
nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state 
and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or 
between the state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect.”157 
Here, it is beyond cavil that the party principally responsible for the 
activity is the U.S. securities firm. Surely the United States has stronger 
connections with its securities firms than the European Union does. 
Therefore, this factor also points towards the United States having a 
stronger interest in regulating the relevant conduct. 
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c. Character and Importance of Regulated Activity and the Extent to 
Which Other States Regulate It 
Section 403(2)(c) directs consideration of “the character of the 
activity to be regulated, the importance of the regulation to the regulating 
state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the 
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally 
accepted.”158 For U.S. securities regulators, mandatory data retention is 
very important, since allowing data erasure would undermine regulators’ 
ability to monitor securities firms to ensure market integrity and investor 
protection. 
While the European Union certainly considers data privacy rights 
important, the interaction of MiFID and the legal obligation exception to 
erasure requirements indicates that the European Union does not view 
data privacy rights with as high a level of importance as the United States 
views data preservation laws, which provide no exceptions. Therefore, 
this factor also points toward the United States having a stronger interest 
in regulating the relevant conduct. 
On the extent to which other states regulate the relevant conduct, the 
tradition of MiFID again matters. MiFID shows that, internationally, it is 
not uncommon for states to require financial institutions to retain at least 
some data.159 It reflects a shared policy interest of both the United States 
and the European Union.160 On the other hand, the European Union is 
unique in mandating erasure on demand.161 Thus, this factor should weigh 
even more strongly towards the United States having a stronger interest 
in regulating the relevant conduct. 
d. Justified Expectations 
Section 403(2)(d) directs consideration of “the existence of justified 
expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation.”162 
Applying GDPR would hurt the justified expectation the US has. The 
                                                            
 158. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
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 160. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (discussing public policy considerations of SEC 
Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4). 
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United States expects data to be stored, sometimes in WORM format.163 
The requirement’s purpose is to make data available to regulators for 
audits, Rule 8210 requests, and other data demands.164 Regulators’ 
expectations that securities firms will comply by providing “legible, true 
and complete” copies of required records would be “undermined to the 
extent that these records are inaccurate . . . or capable of alteration.”165 
Applying U.S. securities law would thus protect this expectation. 
Conversely, applying GDPR’s erasure requirement would hurt this 
expectation. 
This factor should weigh the United States’ interest in market 
integrity and regulatory competence more heavily than the European 
Union’s interest in data protection. The former is a market-wide interest 
protecting the broad class of participants in U.S. capital markets, 
including both Americans and Europeans. 
Other EU laws even recognize such an expectation as justified.166 
MiFID Recital 57 calls that directive’s limited mandatory data 
preservation rule is “justified to strengthen investor protection, to improve 
market surveillance and increase legal certainty in the interest of 
investment firms and their clients.”167 
Even assuming a European customer has an expectation that the 
financial institution will honor his or her erasure demands, such 
expectation must not be “justified.”168 European customers can choose 
whether to enter U.S. capital markets; other participants cannot choose to 
exclude them. Adjudging the 403(2)(d) interest in favor of GDPR would 
forcibly deprive market participants of the U.S. regulatory system’s 
expected benefits.169 Adjudging in favor of U.S. securities law would not 
                                                            
 163. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (explaining regulators’ 
expectation that securities firms will “promptly furnish legible, true and complete copies 
of” required records). 
 164. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (explaining regulators’ 
expectation that securities firms will “promptly furnish legible, true and complete copies 
of” required records); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text (explaining FINRA 
Rule 8210). 
 165. SEC Interpretation: Electronic Storage of Broker-Dealer Records, Exchange Act 
Release 34-44238 (May 1, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-44238.htm. 
[https://perma.cc/F29F-VGGK]. 
 166. Council Regulation 2014/65, recital 57, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 25 (EC). 
 167. Id.; see also discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403(2) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1987). 
 169. See id. 
230 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXV 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
deprive European customers of their expectation, since they can simply 
choose not to participate in the United States’ capital markets. A 
European customer entering a foreign capital market should not deprive 
that market’s regulators of its ability to enforce the regulatory scheme 
implemented by a democratically-elected Congress. Nor should they 
deprive other market participants of the market integrity benefit the 
regulatory scheme was designed to provide. 
This remains true even when U.S. financial institutions market their 
services to European customers. Those customers can still choose 
whether to transact with U.S. financial institutions, which are governed 
by U.S. law. 
The United States’ interest in market integrity weighs in favor of 
applying U.S. law and weighs more heavily than the European interest in 
individual persons’ erasure demands. Europeans concerned about their 
data privacy and erasure rights can simply avoid doing business with the 
United States. However, as long as the U.S. financial markets remain open 
to international business, other market participants cannot avoid the loss 
of market integrity that would result from giving special treatment to EU 
residents. 
e. Importance to and Traditions of the International System 
Section 403(e) and (f) direct consideration of a regulation’s 
“importance . . . to the international political, legal, or economic system” 
and the “extent to which [it] is consistent with the traditions of” those 
systems.170 
Even though MiFID may not necessarily apply, its existence creates 
a tradition that securities firms are different than other businesses and can 
reasonably be required to retain some data regardless of what the 
customer wants. That tradition should weaken the European Union’s 
interest, since U.S. regulations are consistent with the tradition embodied 
by MiFID. The fact that the GDPR was enacted against the backdrop of 
MiFID, and provides a legal obligation exception, suggests that GDPR’s 
enactment does not vitiate the tradition embodied by MiFID that 
mandatory data retention rules for financial institutions are not per se 
unreasonable. 
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2. Balancing the Interests 
For these reasons, a court should conclude from the interest 
balancing test that the United States has a stronger interest than the 
European Union does in regulating securities transactions between U.S. 
securities firms and EU customers. Under Section 403(3) then, the GDPR 
must yield to U.S. securities law. 
B. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT WITH RESPECT TO U.S. BANKING LAW 
WHEN LITIGATED IN U.S. COURTS 
1. Identifying and Analyzing Each States’ Interests 
Next, this analysis identifies the United States’ and European 
Union’s interests with respect to banking law. 
a. Restatement Factors 403(2)(a), (b), and (d)-(f) 
The same considerations relevant to securities law are also relevant 
to banking law with respect to Restatement factors 403(2)(a), (b), (d), (e), 
and (f).171 As with securities law, these factors weight more strongly 
toward the United States’ interest in having its banking law apply as well. 
So, this section limits discussion to factor (c). 
b. Character and Importance of Regulated Activity and the Extent to 
Which Other States Regulate It 
Section 403(2)(c) directs consideration of “the character of the 
activity to be regulated, the importance of the regulation to the regulating 
state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the 
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally 
accepted.”172 The character of data retention in banking law is even more 
important, given the anti-money laundering rules imposed by the Bank 
Secrecy Act. Given the ability of money launderers to move money to 
“high risk” countries, U.S. regulators have a very strong interest in having 
access to bank data to prevent laundered money from reaching “high risk” 
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countries, including countries with a high risk of terrorist financing 
activity.173 
2. Balancing the Interests 
For these reasons, a court should conclude from the interest 
balancing test that the United States has a stronger interest than the 
European Union does in regulating banking transactions between U.S. 
banks and EU customers. Under Section 403(3) then, the GDPR must 
yield to U.S. banking law. 
C. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT WITH RESPECT TO EUROPEAN COURT 
JUDGMENTS AGAINST U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
In Yahoo! France, the Ninth Circuit argued in dicta that U.S. courts 
could refuse to enforce foreign judgments where the judgment was based 
on a cause of action repugnant to U.S. public policy.174 U.S. federal courts, 
and many state courts, apply the repugnancy standard; they should 
continue to do so because EU law should not be have the effect of 
disabling U.S. financial regulators and harming those they protect.175 This 
Note argues that any U.S. court should refuse to enforce foreign erasure 
orders that conflict with U.S. financial law’s mandatory data preservation 
requirements. They should so refuse because, as explained supra during 
the interest balancing tests, the erasure requirement is strongly contrary 
to U.S. public policy. 
Congress has recognized that mandatory data preservation is central 
to U.S. public policy.176 Preservation is central for three reasons. First, the 
financial regulatory regime recognizes that regulators have limited 
resources.177 The SEC, for example, relies not just on FINRA, but also on 
securities firms to enforce securities laws.178 Policing transactions ex ante 
would be impractical as well. To regulate firms’ behavior ex post, 
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regulators need access to data about that behavior. So, regulators would 
have to maintain data themselves if firms were not required to. This would 
divert regulators’ limited resources away from other regulatory 
operations. However, it would be regulators’ only option since their 
expectations of firms’ compliance would be undermined insofar as such 
records can be edited or deleted.179 
Second, mandatory data preservation rules prevent regulated firms 
from shirking their responsibility for internally assuring compliance with 
financial law.180 In the absence of such rules, profit motives could 
incentivize financial institutions to cut their expenses on compliance 
programs by not maintaining data. Since regulators rely on financial 
institutions to maintain data, these rules serve an important public policy 
of assuring regulators the data will be available without the risk that 
regulated entities delete it to save money. 
Third, mandatory data preservation protects regulators from 
obstruction.181 Without such rules, firms could hide regulatory violations 
from regulators by deleting inculpatory data. Data preservation rules 
counteract this incentive: deleting evidence of a violation is itself a 
violation. 
Applying the “[e]xtreme, intolerable differences” standard, courts 
should refuse enforcement of European judgments requiring deletion 
because they are inconsistent with the U.S. public policy favoring data 
preservation. Given the importance of mandatory data retention rules just 
discussed, deviating from these rules would be extreme. Since financial 
regulators cannot properly regulate financial institutions without 
mandatory data retention rules, such deviation would also invalidate the 
public policy choices underlying U.S. financial regulation. 
Applying the “fundamental notions” standard, courts should also 
refuse enforcement. Regulatory failure would likely result in regulatory 
violations going undetected. Because allowing exceptions to the data 
retention rules would compromise regulators’ ability to regulate, such 
exceptions would likely result in regulatory violations going undetected. 
Regulation provides a blanket of protection against indecent and unjust 
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conduct. Cutting a hole in that blanket would thus be repugnant to U.S. 
public policy under the “fundamental notions” standard. 
Under both standards, European judgments compelling data deletion 
are repugnant to U.S. public policy. Whichever standard courts adopt, 
they should thus refuse to enforce such European judgments. Data 
deletion orders are not merely inconsistent with U.S. law; they are 
exceedingly inconsistent with a central element of U.S. public policy 
judgments about how to regulate the securities and banking industries. 
CONCLUSION 
Resolving the conflict between U.S. financial law and GDPR thus 
requires two different approaches depending on the court in which the 
litigation commences. When litigation begins in U.S. courts, U.S. 
securities and banking law should prevail over GDPR since the interest 
balancing tests weigh in favor of U.S. law. However, when litigation 
begins in Europe, U.S. courts should refuse enforcement because the 
erasure requirement is repugnant to U.S. public policy. 
 
